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Abstract - The negotiation process of international treaties is heavily determined by
socioeconomic factors, such as non-developed countries needing resources from developed
countries or developed countries outsourcing labor to non-developed countries. In this pa-
per, we aim to analyze the dynamics in a five-compartment mathematical model using an
epidemiological approach to understand treaty negotiation processes. We do so by categoriz-
ing them into different interest groups based on their attitudes towards the treaty (support,
non-support, and withdrawal) as well as their socioeconomic statuses (developed and non-
developed) and modeling the movement of countries between supporting, not supporting,
and withdrawing. Using an epidemiological approach, we create parameters to measure the
movement of countries from group to group. There are two equilibrium states, which re-
veal the conditions under which all countries would either support or oppose a treaty. We
explore several hypothetical scenarios under which equilibria would occur, demonstrating
the practical applications of our model. We further analyze the model’s real life application
through two case studies that are using the same interest groups towards an international
matter involving the same type of socioeconomic classes: the first is on the Basel Conven-
tion’s negotiation process and the second is on a non-traditional international treaty about
carbon pricing.
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1 Introduction
In 1988, the Nigerian government discovered 18,000 tons of toxic waste illegally dumped
in the small village of Koko by Italian businesses. Several people had already been poi-
soned by toxins leaching into the soil. The Koko Village incident raised public awareness
of the international waste trade [16, 17]. In response, the United Nations (UN) organized
the Basel Convention [11, 28], an environmental treaty that aimed to reduce and regulate
the transboundary disposal of wastes. The strongest supporters and the first signers were
the less-developed, waste-importing states. They were followed by many of the remaining
global community over the next three years. However, some notable states such as the
United States (US) ultimately withdrew from the treaty, directly causing its ineffective-
ness today [11].
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We define a country coalition as a group of countries sharing and advocating a specific
interest. The case of the Basel Convention raises the question: how do different country
coalitions change during the negotiation process of an international treaty?
The goal of this paper is to provide a mathematical framework to shed light on in-
ternational negotiation dynamics. The model we present will provide a glimpse of the
movement of countries over time. With this information, diplomats can craft more effec-
tive environmental treaties by choosing to include or exclude certain countries from parts
of the negotiation process, based on how they might influence others [14]. They can also
target countries who are more likely to be swayed. Additionally, the negotiation timeline
might be shortened or lengthened, to take advantage of certain tipping points within the
process that can be identified in our model. These strategic insights, when combined with
effective policy, can make the difference between a successful and a failed treaty.
In the case of the Basel Convention, there is a coalition of waste-importing (support-
ers of treaty) countries, a coalition of waste-exporting (non-supporters) countries, and a
coalition of countries who have withdrawn from the treaty. The scope and number of
coalitions obviously differ from treaty to treaty. Whereas the dynamics within the Basel
Convention can be separated into three main forces, other treaties appear more difficult
to classify because a country can belong to different coalitions at the same time. For
instance, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas has mul-
tiple different coalitions of countries, each pushing for different limits on tuna catch while
supporting for the treaty itself [31]. The variations in the number of interest groups and
their goals can complicate any analysis of negotiation dynamics.
This paper examines a simplified version of negotiation dynamics by identifying three
main coalitions based on support and whose scopes are determined by socioeconomic fac-
tors. Three coalitions is necessary for understanding negotiation dynamics, because in
any international treaty, there will be countries who support the treaty, countries who op-
pose the treaty, and countries who withdraw from the treaty. Throughout the negotiation
process, countries within each of these coalitions influence countries from other coalitions
to adopt their position. Influence is heavily dependent on socioeconomic factors, as recent
research into international relations reveals [13, 33]. Some countries choose to emulate
economic, religious, and language peers. Others may prefer to appease trade partners.
While the most economically powerful countries, like the US, are being emulated by other
countries. In environmental cases especially, countries’ economic statuses play the great-
est role in determining whether or not they support the treaty [13, 33].
We define influence as the ability of a coalition to spread its ideas and values (e.g.,
support for a treaty) to countries in other coalitions, thus convincing them to change their
positions. Many recent studies show that these ideas and values spread in a manner simi-
lar to epidemics in a population [5, 4, 15, 31]. Hence, we can divide the total population,
all the countries in the world, into three compartments: supporters (S), non-supporters
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(N), and withdrawals (W ). Further, each of these compartments can be split according
to their socio-economic status, and thus we can analyze the impact of these factors. We
can model transitions between compartments, caused by inter-coalition influence, by a set
of differential equations.
In terms of the voting process, there have been studies on how individuals have an
influence and this can be extracted on an international level. In [20], Nickerson discusses
how voting can be contagious and thus influences others to follow suit, or how people
rely on close relations such as friends or family members to help obtain information that
can affect their decisions [23]. The discussion in [6] explores strategic voting for citizens
to elect officials that can have influence on international environmental debates that can
be in favor of the voters. Once we have established which countries are grouped into
S, N , and W , then we can see which coalitions are being influenced by countries that
are closely related to its members, such as US and Canada, or countries in the United
Kingdom. There have been stochastic modeling studies on how influential individuals
affect a core group [10, 21] such as lobbyists or activists recruiting voters. However, in
applying the epidemiological framework, as inspired by [15], we can focus on the collective
groups rather than a certain individual to model the behavior of how groups evolve in an
international treaty proceedings.
The negotiation process encompasses the period in which diplomats from various coun-
tries are in direct contact at a formal meeting. We limit our time frame because first, the
total number of countries in the world is very unlikely to change within such a short time
span. Second, it is unlikely that a country’s domestic politics and socioeconomic status
will change drastically enough within this period to alter its stance on a treaty. Since this
paper intends to focus on international dynamics, a short time period that allows us to
focus solely on international factors is ideal.
In [15], the investigators study the development of third parties in the US and how they
gain votes in elections. Their (third-party voting) model focuses on the voter population
and groups them into five categories: M (party members), H (voters highly susceptible
to third party ideology), L (voters barely susceptible to third party ideology), VH (third
party voting individuals deriving from H), and VL (third party voting individuals deriving
from L). There are influential parameters that quantify the rate at which some groups
recruit new members from other groups. For example, β1 is the recruitment rate of H
into VH by individuals in VH , VL and M . This model also considers the rate at which
new people enter the population (i.e. those who have reached voting age) and leaving
(i.e. death). Then, several differential equations are constructed to model the member
changing rate of each group.
The way this third-party voting model quantifies the influential parameters via dif-
ferential equations among groups is useful for the study of how countries influence each
other during the negotiation process of a treaty. However, the way groups are categorized
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is different from the international treaty negotiation process. For example, there is no
equivalent of M , since the voting process for a treaty is not a periodically recurring process
and thus there is no organization within those who support the treaty. In addition, the
natural recruitment rate and attrition rate caused by the change in population is basically
non-existent, as we assume in the short run, the total number of countries should not al-
ter. With this in mind, we take the idea of influential factors and differential equations
and create our Two-Track model that categorizes countries into different interest groups
based on socioeconomic status and assigns new parameters to track how countries move
from group to group.
In the Two-Track model, we divide countries into two socioeconomic groups: de-
veloped and less-developed. Further, we assume countries in each socioeconomic group
move on a track with three options: to support, to not support, or to withdraw. In par-
ticular, countries can move back and forth between supporting and non-supporting, but
once they withdraw they are unable to return to the negotiation. Therefore, we group
countries into five coalitions: supporting developed countries, non-supporting developed
countries, supporting less-developed countries, non-supporting less-developed countries,
and withdrawn countries. This model is inspired by some previous studies and useful in
studying the spread of ideas and values [15]. In terms of an epidemiological approach,
we can establish that non-supporting and withdrawn countries are the “infected” groups
and all others are “non-infected”. Moving into the non-supporting groups from the two
support groups are, in a sense, capturing the behavior of new infections. Moving from
non-supporting to withdrawn is the transitional movements of infected groups to infected
groups.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2, we study a simplified One-Track model
to show certain properties, including stability of equilibrium states. We then build upon
the One-Track model in Section 3, where we analyze the Two-Track model’s equilibrium
states and simulate hypothetical scenarios with parameters by choice. Finally, we discuss
two case studies where we use the Two-Track model on the Basel Convention’s negotiation
process (Section 4) and on a non-traditional international treaty of carbon pricing (Section
5).
2 The One-Track Model
First, let us consider the One-Track model to generate the discussion of how an epidemi-
ological model can capture the behavior of international treaty negotiations. We will see
that the one-track model is overly oversimplified and will need to build a more sophisti-
cated model necessary to discuss the dynamics of treaty negotiations (in Section 3).
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Figure 1: The One-Track Model Diagram. The arrows illustrate direction of movement
between compartments.
We assume that ideas and values (e.g., support for a treaty) spread in a similar man-
ner as epidemics in a population. This means that the population can be divided into
several compartments and transitions between compartments can be modeled by a set of
differential equations.
Taking inspiration from [15], we focus on country coalitions and that at any point
during the negotiation of an international treaty, all countries can be classified as sup-
porters, non-supporters, or withdrawn states. Supporters are defined as all the countries
who, if negotiations were ended at some time, would sign the treaty. Non-supporters are
defined as all who, if negotiations were ended at some time, would not sign the treaty.
Withdrawn are defined as the countries who have left the negotiation process.
Let S, N , and W be the variables to describe the number of countries who support
the treaty, countries who do not support the treaty, and withdrawn countries respectively.
As discussed in Section 1, the movement of countries from non-supporting status to with-
drawn status is strictly unidirectional, while the movement between non-supporting status
and supporting status is bidirectional. See Figure 1.
We assume that treaty negotiations occur over a relatively short period of time. Thus,
the total number of countries (T > 0) in the system remains constant (dT/dt = 0). Do-
mestic politics remain mostly stable within the short time frame. Hence, any changes to
a country’s position on a treaty can be attributed to international, rather than internal,
influence. Countries that withdraw from negotiations will not return, which is why this
movement is unidirectional.
In Section 1, we defined influence as the ability of a coalition to spread its ideas and
values to countries in other coalitions and thus convincing movement between coalitions.
Mathematically, “influence” in this model is represented by the function that character-
izes the movement from one coalition to another. The goal of this analysis is not to
identify what influences a country to move from coalition to coalition, whether it be the
effectiveness of the contact that countries have with one another, the size of the coun-
try, etc. The goal is to quantify the movement of countries using the data that we have
obtained to predict the movement of countries if the negotiations were to continue or if
they were to end prematurely. This quantification of movement can account for several
factors such as size of the country, effectiveness of discussion between countries, etc, how-
ever, we do not address causation of movement here as it is not the main goal of our study.
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The movement from N to S is a function of the influence that all supporting countries
exert on N :
φSN, (1)
where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 is the recruitment rate of N into S, a percentage of countries that a
representative (or representatives) from countries in S comes in direct contact with rep-
resentative (or representatives) from N that successfully convinces a country to change
from the non-support to support coalition. Note that φ = 0 when there are no countries
moving from non-support to support.
The number of countries that move from S to N is a function of the influence that all
non-supporting countries and withdrawn countries exert on SD:
(βN + α′W )S, (2)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the attrition rate of countries in S caused by countries in N . Note that
if β = 0, then none of the countries in the non-support coalition are trying to influence
countries in the support coalition to change their position. If β < 1, then this means that
not all of the countries in the non-support coalition are trying to influence countries in
the support coalition to change their position. We can also note W has an augmentation
factor (α′) to indicate the influence of countries who have withdrawn from negotiations
can wield influence differently than countries that do not support, that is α′ may or may
not be equal to β. If α′ = 0, then none of the withdrawn countries are trying to influence
the other countries to withdraw. Note that α′ can be greater or less than β. For simplicity,
we let α = α′/β, then (2) becomes:
β(N + αW )SD. (3)
Finally, we can describe the movement of countries from non-supporting to withdrawn:
γWN, (4)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the attrition rate of N into W caused by countries in W . Similar to
that of φ, if γ = 0, then there are no countries moving to withdraw.
The following system of equations depicts the movement within the One-Track model
depicted in Figure 1:
dS
dt
= φSN − β(N + αW )S, (5)
dN
dt
= β(N + αW )S − φSN − γWN, (6)
dW
dt
= γWN, (7)
T = S +N +W, (8)
dT
dt
= 0. (9)
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The movement of countries can be quantified by (1) - (4). For our analysis in Sections
2.1 and 2.2 we provide theoretical values for the parameters in equations (5) - (7).
2.1 Equilibria Analysis
We can determine the equilibria of the system by analyzing equations (5) - (9).
Setting (7) equal to 0, we can see that either W = 0, N = 0, or both equal to 0. This
leads to three types of equilibrium for the one-track model. The first is complete support,
where we have all countries in the support coalition, and none in the non-support and
withdrawn (N = W = 0). The second is complete withdrawal, where we have all countries
in the withdraw coalition, and none in the support and non-support (S = N = 0). The
last is complete non-support, where we have all countries in the non-support coalition,
and none in the support and withdraw (S = W = 0).
2.1.1 E1: Complete Support Equilibrium
According to equation (8), we can replace S by T −N −W , thus reducing the system of
equations to the following:
dN
dt
= β(N + αW )(T −N −W )− φ(T −N −W )N − γWN, (10)
dW
dt
= γWN. (11)
To analyze the equilibria that depends on N and W , we compute the partial first
derivatives (the Jacobian) with respect to N and W :
J(N,W ) =
(
Nφ−Wγ − βS∗ − βM + φS∗ Nφ−Nγ − βM − αβS∗
γW γN
)
,
where S∗ = N − T +W , M = N +Wα.
A treaty achieves complete support equilibrium at (0, 0), when all countries support
(and will likely sign) the treaty, that is when
J(0, 0) =
(
(β − φ)T αβ
0 0
)
.
The eigenvalues of this Jacobian matrix are 0 and T (β − φ). Thus, when β < φ, or
when the attrition rate of supporting countries caused by non-supporting countries is less
than the recruitment rate of non-supporting countries into the supporting coalition, the
eigenvalues are non-positive and thus the equilibrium point (0, 0) is locally asymptotically
stable.
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2.1.2 E2: Complete Withdrawal Equilibrium
Similarly, we can replace W by T−N−S, reduce the system of equations to the following,
and calculate its Jacobian with respect to S and N :
dS
dt
= φSN − β(N + α(T −N − S))S, (12)
dN
dt
= β(N + α(T −N − S))S − φSN − γ(T −N − S)N, (13)
J(S,N) =
(
Nφ− β(N − αW ∗) + Sαβ Sφ+ Sβ(α− 1)
Nγ −Nφ+ β(N − αW ∗)− Sαβ Nγ − Sφ+ γW ∗ − Sβ(α− 1)
)
,
where W ∗ = N + S − T .
A treaty achieves complete withdrawal equilibrium at (0,0), when no country is in the
negotiation process of the treaty:
J(0, 0) =
(−Tαβ 0
−Tαβ −Tγ
)
.
The eigenvalues of this Jacobian matrix are −Tγ and −Tαβ. With countries in W
then α and γ are positive. Since N = 0, then β = 0. The equilibrium point (0,0) is locally
asymptotically stable.
2.1.3 E3: Complete Non-Support Equilibrium
We can replace N by T − S −W , thus reducing the system of equations to the following,
and calculate its Jacobian with respect to S and W :
dS
dt
= φ(T − S −W )S − β(T − S −W + αW )S, (14)
dW
dt
= γW (T − S −W ), (15)
J(S,W ) =
(
Sβ − Sφ+ βN∗ − βWα− φN∗ −Sφ− Sβ(α− 1)
−γW −γ(N∗ +W )
)
,
where N∗ = S − T +W .
A treaty achieves complete non-support equilibrium at (0, 0), when no countries sup-
port (nor will likely sign) the treaty, that is when
J(0, 0) =
(
(φ− β)T 0
0 γT
)
.
The eigenvalues of this Jacobian matrix are Tγ and −T (β − φ). Since W = 0 there
are no withdrawn countries and thus no influence from them, that is γ = 0. Thus, when
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β > φ, that is when the attrition rate of support is higher than the recruitment rate of
non-support to support, then the equilibrium point (0, 0) is locally asymptotically stable.
2.2 Expected Results
We assume that depending on the value of the parameters, different equilibria will be
reached. From the analysis of eigenvalues, there are a few observations to be made.
If β < φ, a complete support will be reached. Noting that the eigenvalues for the
complete support case do not depend on γ, we will see that if γ > 0 then (an almost)
complete support will be reached with a few countries in the withdrawn coalition. If γ = 0,
then all countries will be in support. We provide the following influential parameters for
complete support in Figure 2: β = 0.049; φ = 0.15; α = 0.01; γ = 0.02; T = 195; initial
number of non-supporting countries (N) is 185; initial number of withdrawn counties (W )
is 5; the time span is 1 year. Note that at the 1-year mark, because γ > 0 and β < φ,
that N drops from 180 to 0 and W is staying steady at a low number, indicating that all
other countries are in S.
Figure 2: Complete Support. Here, N (Non-supporting, blue) approaches 0 and W
(Withdrawn from negotiation, pink) stabilizes at a low level.
If γ > 0 and β > φ, then complete withdraw will be observed. We can see this in
Figure 3, the influential parameters are: β = 0.075; φ = 0.015; α = 0.01; γ = 0.02;
T = 195; initial number of non-supporting countries (N) is 90; initial number of sup-
porting counties (S) is 90; the time span is 5 years. We see that because β > φ there is
an increase in N and a decrease in S, but both coalitions decrease to 0 as negotiation is
continuing to the 5-year mark.
If γ = 0 and β > φ, then complete non-support will be observed. This is evident from
Figure 4, the influential parameters are: β = 0.075; φ = 0.015; α = 0.01; γ = 0.00; T =
195; initial number of non-supporting countries (N) is 90; initial number of supporting
counties (S) is 90; the time span is 1 year. Unlike the example with γ > 0, since γ = 0,
there is no influence from the withdrawn coalition to attract non-supporters, thus N rises
to its maximum.
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Figure 3: Complete Withdrawal. S (Supporting, orange) approaches 0 as countries turn
against the treaty and enter N (Non-supporting, blue), causing the initial increase of N .
Then N approaches 0 as countries further lose interest and withdraw from the negotiation
process.
Figure 4: Complete Non-Support. Here, S (Supporting, orange) approaches 0 as countries
turn against the treaty. They subsequently enter N (Non-supporting, blue) and reach an
overwhelming majority.
3 The Two-Track Model
In the previous section, the One-Track Model only consisted of three compartments (S,
N , and W ). This simple representation was a great way to understand how countries
are moving from one compartment to the other and how we can define the parameters to
describe the movements.
However, to examine the influences of different socio-economic groups (developed or
less-developed), we can roughly split the countries in supporting and non-supporting
coalitions into sub-coalitions, depending on their status as developed or less-developed
countries. We use the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) to classify which 195 coun-
tries are socio-economic peers to each other. Specifically, 59 developed countries are those
ranked in the “highly developed” category as designated by the UN [29]. Less-developed
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countries are all of the remaining 136 countries. We can still assume that withdrawn coun-
tries exert a similar level of influence over both developed and less developed countries.
This is because once they are absent from the negotiation table, they have substantially
less power relevant to the treaty itself and thus do not influence any particular group more
than the other. For future research, it would be interesting to split the withdrawn group
into developed and less-developed countries to observe the different movements between
coalitions.
We categorize countries into five groups and let SD, SL, ND, NL, and W be the
variables to describe the number of developed and less-developed countries who support
the treaty, developed and less-developed countries who do not support the treaty, and
withdrawn countries respectively. Countries in each socioeconomic group can move on a
track with three options, namely supporting, non-supporting and withdrawal from one
end of the spectrum to the other. As discussed in Section 1 and as we saw in Section
2, the movement of countries from non-supporting status to withdrawn status is strictly
unidirectional, while the movement between non-supporting status and supporting status
is bidirectional, see Figure 5.
The total number of countries (T ) in the system still remains constant (dT/dt = 0).
Also, countries that withdraw from negotiations will not return, which is why this move-
ment is unidirectional.
The movement from ND to SD is a function of the influence that all supporting devel-
oped countries exert on ND:
φ1(τ1SD + SL)ND, (16)
where 0 ≤ φ1 ≤ 1 is the recruitment rate of ND into SD. Similar in the One-Track Model,
φ1 = 0 is when there are no countries moving from non-support to support. Note that
SD has an augmentation factor (τ1) to indicate that countries among SD can wield more
influence than countries among SL, meaning that τ1 may or may not be equal to 1. The
equation that describes the movement of NL to SL can be derived in a similar manner
with respect to φ2, the recruitment rate of NL to SL, and τ2, the augmentation factor for
SL. If τ1 = 0 or τ2 = 0, then none of the supporting developed or less-developed countries
are trying to recruit or influence the non-supporting developed or less-developed countries
to change their positions respectively.
The number of countries that move from SD to ND is a function of the influence that all
non-supporting countries (both developed and less-developed) and withdrawn countries
exert on SD:
(β1(ND +NL) + α
′
1W )SD, (17)
where 0 ≤ β1 ≤ 1 is the attrition rate of countries in SD caused by countries in both ND
and NL. If β1 = 0 then none of the countries in the non-support coalitions are trying to
recruit or influence countries in SD to change position. Note that W has an augmentation
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factor (α′1) to indicate the influence of countries who have withdrawn from negotiations
can wield more influence than countries that do not support (from developed and less-
developed), that is α′1 may or may not be equal to β1. For simplicity, we let α1 = α
′
1/β1,
then (17) becomes
β1(ND +NL + α1W )SD. (18)
The movement of SL to NL can be derived in a similar manner, with respect to β2, α
′
2,
and α2 as
β1(ND +NL + α2W )SL. (19)
In addition, since α1 (and similarly α2) are factors that indicate the influence of the coun-
tries that have withdrawn regardless of socio-economic status then we can let α = α1 = α2
be the factor to indicate the attrition rate of supporting countries to non-supporting coun-
tries by countries that have withdrawn from negotiations. If α = 0, then none of the
withdrawn countries are trying to influence other countries to change from support to
non-support.
Finally, we can describe the movement of countries from non-supporting to withdrawn
by
γW (ND +NL), (20)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the attrition rate of ND and NL into W caused by countries in W .
Similar to the One-Track model, γ = 0 indicates that none of the withdrawn countries
are trying to influence countries to withdraw.
Similar to the One-Track Model, (16) - (20) quantifies the movement of countries for
the Two-Track Model. We provide theoretical values for the parameters in equations (16)
- (20) for our analysis in Sections 3.2. As we discuss specific examples in Section 4 and 5
we provide a way to calculate these parameters using obtained data.
The following system of equations describe our Two-Track model depicted in Figure
5:
dSD
dt
= φ1(τ1SD + SL)ND − β1(ND +NL + αW )SD, (21)
dSL
dt
= φ2(τ2SL + SD)NL − β2(NL +ND + αW )SL, (22)
dND
dt
= β1(ND +NL + αW )SD − φ1(τ1SD + SL)ND − γWND, (23)
dNL
dt
= β2(NL +ND + αW )SL − φ2(τ2SL + SD)NL − γWNL, (24)
dW
dt
= γW (ND +NL), (25)
T = SD + SL +ND +NL +W, (26)
dT
dt
= 0. (27)
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Figure 5: The Two Track Model Diagram. The arrows illustrate direction of movement
between compartments.
3.1 Analysis of Two Track Model
We now turn to the stability analysis of the Two-Track Model. Similar to the One-Track
Model, we will be analyzing the equilibria of the system.
3.1.1 Steady-states
When W = 0 we have the following steady-states:
S1 = (SD, SL, 0, 0, 0), (28)
S2 = (
φ1SL
β1 − φ1τ1 , SL, ND, 0, 0), (29)
S3 = (SD,
φ2SD
β2 − φ2τ2 , 0, NL, 0), (30)
S4 = (0, 0, ND, NL, 0) (31)
S5 = (SD, 0,
β1NL
φ1τ1 − β1 , NL, 0), (32)
S6 = (0, SL, ND,
β2ND
φ2τ2 − β2 , 0), (33)
S7 = (S
∗
D, SL, N
∗
D, N
∗
L, 0). (34)
With stability analysis, we can perturb from the state of S1 and see through numer-
ical simulations that S1 is unstable. Note that S2 is a solution only when β2 = 0 and
β1 > φ1τ1. Similarly, S3 is a solution only when β1 = 0 and β2 > φ2τ2. By perturbing from
the states and observing numerically, both S2 and S3 are unstable solutions. Similarly,
S4 is an unstable solution. Also note that S5 is a solution when φ2 = 0 and φ1τ1 > β1.
Similarly, S6 is a solution when φ1 = 0 and φ2τ2 > β2. Both S5 and S6 are semi-stable
solutions from numerical observations.
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Finally, S7 is the solution when there are countries in all groups except W , and
S∗D = SLR,
N∗D =
(T − S∗D − SL)β1S∗D
φ1(τ1S∗D + SL)
,
N∗L = N
∗
D
φ1(τ1S
∗
D + SL)− β1S∗D
β1S∗D
,
where R is the positive root of ax2 + bx+ c and a = φ2(φ1τ1−β1), b = τ2a+φ1(φ2−β2τ1),
c = φ1(φ2τ2 − β2).
We should note that S7 has its own class of solutions. For example, when a = 0, that
is when φ1τ1 = β1, we choose b and c values such that bc < 0, otherwise this would mean
that S∗D < 0. Therefore, when observing the steady state solution, S7 only has meaning
when the choice of parameters β1, β2, φ1, φ2, τ1, and τ2 make R a real positive number.
There are four classes of solutions for when R is a real positive number. The first is when
a = 0 and bc < 0 as we have described. The second is when b2 − 4ac = 0, and b < 0, this
root has multiplicity 2. The two other classes of solutions are:
S∗D,i = SLRi,
N∗D,i =
(T − S∗D,i − SL)β1S∗D,i
φ1(τ1S∗D,i + SL)
,
N∗L,i = N
∗
D,i
φ1(τ1S
∗
D,i + SL)− β1S∗D,i
β1S∗D,i
,
for i = {1, 2} where Ri is one of the two positive distinct real roots of multiplicity 1 of
ax2 + bx+ c. Each of these solutions are unstable through numerical observations.
When W 6= 0, we only have one steady-state:
W1 = (0, 0, 0, 0,W ), (35)
which is stable through numerical observations.
3.2 Simulated examples
In this section, we simulate a few scenarios to show complete withdrawal from a treaty,
an example of a successful treaty, and how time can play a role in the negotiation process.
In Figure 6, we simulate the complete withdrawal equilibrium of the two track model.
Suppose there are 29 supporting developed countries (SD), 68 supporting less-developed
countries (SL), 29 non-supporting developed countries (ND), 68 non-supporting less-
developed countries (NL), and 1 withdrawn country (W ). Note that dW/dt (equation
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(25)) is non-zero when both γ and W is not zero. That is, should there be no countries
in W to recruit in the first place, the group will never exist.
We define t = 0 as the beginning of negotiations, t = 1 as the end of negotiations, and
t > 1 describes what would happen if negotiations were to continue.
In addition, we use the following parameters: β1 = 0.055; φ1 = 0.015; α = 0.025;
β2 = 0.075; φ2 = 0.005; γ = 0.02; τ1 = τ2 = 1.5; T = 195. These initial test figures are
derived from studying the Basel Convention and carbon pricing case studies, which we
will explain in greater detail in Sections 4 and 5. Figure 6 is the plot of the simulation
with the parameters we have indicated. The number of countries supporting the treaty of
both groups (SD in blue, SL in orange) decrease, corresponding to the initial increase of
number of countries that do not support the treaty (ND in yellow, NL in purple). After
t = 0.75, the two groups that do not support the treaty start losing members as well,
indicating that these countries have entered the withdrawn group. Hence the complete
withdrawal state is reached in the 5-year period.
Figure 6: Complete Withdrawal for two track model. Blue: SD, Orange: SL, Yellow: ND,
Purple: NL;.
Next, we have Figure 7 from the simulation with the following parameters: β1 = 0.022;
φ1 = 0.015; α = 0.025; β2 = 0.002; φ2 = 0.005; γ = 0.02; τ1 = τ2 = 1.5; T = 195. The
initial conditions again are: SD = 29, SL = 68, ND = 29, NL = 68, and W = 1. The
parameters are obtained in a fashion similar to the complete withdrawal scenario. In
this simulation, β2 < φ2, which can be understood as the recruiting influence of SL being
greater than that of NL. As a result, SL (orange line) is steadily increasing, corresponding
to the drop in NL (purple line). On the other hand, β1 > φ1, which means the recruiting
influence of SD is less than ND. This is evident from the initial drop in SD (blue line)
and initial increase in ND (yellow line). However, as time goes on, the greater increase
of SL begins to cancel out the effect of β1 and SD steadily rises, leading to the eventual
pass of the treaty (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Treaty Success for two track model. Blue: SD, Orange: SL, Yellow: ND, Purple:
NL;.
Finally, in Figure 8, we modify the parameters from Figure 7 to observe that the out-
come of the model depends on the time when the negotiation process ends. The parame-
ters are: β1 = 0.08; φ1 = 0.03; α = 0.025; β2 = 0.002; φ2 = 0.005; γ = 0.02; τ1 = τ2 = 1.5;
T = 195. The initial conditions are : SD = 29, SL = 68, ND = 29, NL = 68. Assuming
that negotiation process ends at the t = 1 year mark, we can see from Figure 8 how SD
(blue), SL (orange), ND (yellow), and NL (purple) behave. If the negotiation ends around
t = 2 or after, which can be understood as if the negotiation process lasting twice as
long as the originally planned time (t = 1), the outcome will be that the treaty passes.
However, if the negotiation process ends before that, for example at t = 0.3, which means
if the negotiation process ends a third of the way through, there are more non-supporting
countries than supporting ones (approximately 101 non-supporting versus 92 support-
ing), and therefore the treaty does not pass. The time-sensitivity in certain scenarios is
worth noticing for political leaders and can mean the success or failure of a treaty [24, 30].
Figure 8: A negotiation process where being cut off at different time will yield different
results. Blue: SD, Orange: SL, Yellow: ND, Purple: NL.
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4 Case Study 1: The Basel Convention
We now return to the example we discussed in the introduction, the Basel Convention.
The Basel Convention is an excellent case study for several reasons. First, the vast ma-
jority of decisions were reached early in the negotiation process. We will observe that if
negotiations were to continue beyond this period that the negotiation process would have
yielded a different outcome, similar to Figure 8. Second, the the total number of parties
to the Convention remains constant at 140 states, as our model necessitates. Third, there
is a clear socio-economic (developed and less-developed) divide present between waste-
importers (supporters the Convention) and waste-exporters (opposers the Convention).
We used data on country ratification of the Basel Convention from 1989 to 1992.
Countries who had ratified it were considered supporters, countries who had yet to rat-
ify it were considered opposers, and countries who had left the process entirely were
considered withdrawn. The socio-economic country groupings were determined by each
country’s 1990 UN HDI ranking. The top 58 countries fell in the UN’s “highly developed”
category, and thus were categorized as “developed” for the purposes of our study [28].
The remaining countries were categorized as “less developed” in our study. We should
note that only 140 factions were represented in the negotiation process. Thus not all 58
developed-countries participated nor all less-developed countries participated.
From these assumptions, we found the following number of countries in the negotiation
process:
Year SD SL ND NL W
1989 22 9 33 74 1
1992 20 11 36 71 2
We had 2 countries move from SD to ND, 0 countries move from SL to NL, 0 countries
move from ND to SD, 2 countries move from NL to SL, and 1 country move from NL to
W. For the purposes of our study, we arbitrarily input 0.01 as the number of countries
that moves from SL to NL and from ND to SD to account for the possibility of uncaptured
trends within a small population.
We manipulated equations (21) through (27) to yield the following:
β1 =
Number of SD converted to ND
∆t
1
SD(ND +NL + αW )
(36)
β2 =
Number of SL converted to NL
∆t
1
SL(ND +NL + αW )
(37)
φ1 =
Number of ND converted to SD
∆t
1
ND(τ1SD + SL)
(38)
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φ2 =
Number of NL converted to SL
∆t
1
NL(τ2SL + SD)
(39)
γ =
∆W
∆t
1
(ND +NL)W
(40)
Inputting the values we observed into these equations and adjusting the α, τ1, and τ2
accordingly, we were able to calculate the parameters:
β1 β2 φ1 φ2 γ
0.0004244122 0.0000034582 0.0000032584 0.0002906132 0.0031152648
4.1 Recreating the Negotiation Dynamics
Using the parameters that we have calculated above combined with other parameters that
we control for, we recreate the negotiation dynamics to study the effect of how time can
play a role in the our model.
We can see that the model is fairly accurate in recreating the negotiation dynamics
from t = 0 to t = 3 in Figure 9. In addition, we were interested to see what would hap-
pen if the negotiations were to extend beyond the 3-year mark. In Figure 9, we can see
at the 5-year mark, there was a shift for less developed countries from non-supporter to
supporter status, and a shift for developed countries from supporter to non-supporter sta-
tus. In the ten-year prediction (Figure 10), the number of non-supporting, less-developed
countries drops sharply. Some of this can be explained by a shift to supporting status.
However, many of these less-developed countries have also moved into withdrawn status.
This could be due to a variety of factors: some may have lost faith in the effectiveness
of the Basel Convention, or some may have vested economic interests in continuing the
waste trade [1, 17]. We should note that we only have the start and end data points of
this study to calculate the parameters and do not have further data to test the accuracy
of the model as there were only two meetings recorded [11].
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Figure 9: Simulation of the Basel Convention negotiation process when t = 5, τ1 = τ2 = 1,
α = 0.1. In this picture, SD is in blue, SL is in orange, ND is in yellow, NL is in purple.
Triangle markers are the 1989 data points, diamond markers are the 1992 data points.
Figure 10: Simulation of the Basel Convention negotiation process when t = 10, τ1 =
τ2 = 1, α = 0.1. In this picture, SD is in blue, SL is in orange, ND is in yellow, NL is in
purple. Triangle markers are the 1989 data points, diamond markers are the 1992 data
points.
4.2 Testing Alternative Parameters
In Figures 11 and 12, we investigate whether intra-group influence of developed nations is
stronger than that of less-developed nations. This could happen if less-developed nations
had more factors to consider, such as greater economic dependence on other states, as well
as their own domestic interests [7]. The number of supporting less-developed countries
increases slightly as a result. However, the very small differences reveal the limited effect
of intra-group influences on the overall outcome.
From the two simulations with alternative parameters, we can see that changing τ1,
τ2, and α have limited effect in the outcome of the model. This seems to suggest that
intra-group sympathy in the voting process, if it does exist, has trivial impact on the
voting process. One explanation is most likely due to the size of the support coalition
being smaller than that of the non-support. In this instance, the number of non-support
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have a greater effect than the change of parameters. In addition, when the number of
countries in W is small (approximately 0.67% of total countries), changing α will not
affect the outcome at all.
Figure 11: Simulation of the Basel Convention negotiation process when τ1 = 4, τ2 = 2,
α = 0.1, and other parameters are the same from previous simulation. In this picture, SD
is in blue, SL is in orange, ND is in yellow, NL is in purple.
Figure 12: Simulation of the Basel Convention negotiation process when τ1 = 1, τ2 = 1,
α = 0.5. SD is in blue, SL is in orange, ND is in yellow, NL is in purple. Limited effect
of the change of α from 0.1 to 0.5.
5 Case Study 2: carbon pricing
We can further apply our model by studying the spread of carbon pricing at the state level.
Carbon pricing presents an interesting case study in several ways. First and foremost,
although it is not an international treaty itself, widespread support for carbon pricing
policy mostly comes from treaties such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol
[3, 22]. Thus, the spread of pricing policies will still be influenced by international ne-
gotiations, but with the benefit of accounting for multiple negotiation processes at once.
Additionally, the greater timeline for carbon pricing will allow us to test how the model
responds to the influence of domestic politics. Third, whereas the Basel Convention was
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primarily driven by the interests of less-developed countries, carbon pricing has histori-
cally been driven by more developed countries due to the increased economic strain that
the policy imposes. Investigating how developed countries’ influence and less-developed
countries’ influence differs will be a valuable insight for our model.
We collected the data from the World Bank’s “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing
2018.” Countries who had implemented a carbon pricing scheme before a given date were
considered “supporters” at that time. Countries who had not yet implemented a carbon
pricing scheme before a given date were considered “non-supporters”. By this definition
there were no countries in the withdrawn coalition (W = 0). The socio-economic country
groupings were determined by each country’s 2017 UN HDI ranking. The top 59 countries
fell in the UN’s “highly developed” category, and thus were categorized as “developed” for
the purposes of our study. The remaining countries were categorized as “less-developed.”
We used the data collected within the first three years of carbon price policy to model
state behavior.
The fact that this case study is not a traditional or official international treaty also
means that the withdrawn coalition does not exist because countries are either implement-
ing a pricing scheme (supporting) or not yet implemented (non-supporting) or renegotiat-
ing implementation (moving between support and non-support). This then simplifies the
model and allow us to focus on the dynamics between support and non-support. With
the absence of the withdrawn group, there is no movement from non-support coalitions
to withdrawn coalitions (γ = 0). Additionally, there is no factor of attrition of support
to non-support caused by the withdrawn coalition (α = 0). The model is now dependent
on the φ1, φ2, β1, β2, τ1, and τ2 parameters.
From these assumptions, we found the following number of countries from the World
Bank’s “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018” data:
Year SD SL ND NL
1990 2 0 57 136
1993 5 0 54 136
1996 6 0 53 136
1999 6 0 53 136
2002 7 0 52 136
2005 9 0 50 136
2008 12 0 47 136
2011 14 1 45 135
2014 19 2 40 134
2017 21 4 38 132
2019 24 5 35 131
Looking solely at the first three years, which we will be using to calculate parameters
and predict the remainder of the table, 3 countries move from non-supporting, developed
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status to supporting, developed status. Additionally, we added a rounding error of 0.5 to
the number of countries moving from supporting, developed countries to non-supporting,
developed countries. We also added the error to the number of less-developed countries
moving between supporter and non-supporter status. This error came from the assump-
tion that a majority of a state needs to support or reject a policy before change occurs,
for instance if even half a state were inclined to support carbon pricing, it would be
insufficient to appear as a change in the number of supporting countries.
β1 β2 φ1 φ2
0.0004317789292 0.008635578584 0.008354218881 0.00058356676
Using the above parameters calculated from equations (36) through (39), as well other
parameters that we control for (τ1 = τ2 = 1, α = 0), we recreate the negotiation dynamics
to predict future state behavior.
We can see from Figure 13, that the model closely portrays the negotiation dynam-
ics of the carbon pricing study. Thus, not only can we use this model for international
treaties, but we can use them for non-traditional international treaties. We should note
that in the case of non-traditional treaties, that there are assumptions to be made that
can characterize countries differently. For example, we used the first carbon pricing poli-
cies as the unofficial beginning of negotiations, since arguably, such a move would prompt
other states to discuss the possibility of also implementing carbon prices. However, it is
also possible that a cohort of states were independently catalyzed to implement their own
carbon pricing schemes in the late 1980s. Thus, the initial year-to-year increases in carbon
pricing adoption could simply be due to the differences in the time needed for each country
to roll-out their own programs. Additionally, the non-treaty structure allows for the inclu-
sion of more negotiation processes along with greater domestic influence, as stated earlier.
Figure 13: Simulation of the carbon pricing adoption process when t = 30, τ1 = 1, τ2 = 1.
In this picture, SD is in blue, SL is in orange, ND is in yellow, and NL is in purple.
Diamond markers are the data points collected from the World Bank’s “State and Trends
of Carbon Pricing 2018”.
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6 Discussion
From our results and analysis, we are able to draw several major conclusions. First, we
can see that a large factor in the negotiation process is the sheer force of numbers as
discussed in Section 4 when discussing alternative parameters. Changing the parameters
α, τ1, and τ2 had a minimal effect on whether or not countries shifted from category to
category. A big portion of the effect comes from the size of each coalition. Second, in the
negotiation process, intra-group influence is less important than other factors, and thus
diplomats should focus on collaborating with those who share similar attitudes towards
the treaty instead of trying to pull those dissidents that belong to the same socioeconomic
group. Third, time-sensitivity exists in certain scenarios, where by controlling the ending
time of the negotiation process, we can arrive at opposite outcomes. Therefore, if some
diplomats can understand the movements of countries from previous negotiations using
our model, they might initiate a motion to vote so the process will stop at a point where
their interest is maximized. Ultimately, we can say that the epidemiological approach is
roughly accurate in predicting the dynamics of international treaty negotiations. This
does not simplify the complex process that diplomats have to go through in negotiating
terms but we hope that this provides a bit of insight from a mathematical perspective
into international negotiations.
We recognize that the case studies were limited in a number of ways, which we hope
can be improved in future research. In the Basel case study, the data that was available
were two data points that covered over three years and no further data to test the accuracy
of the model. Thus the 5-year and 10-year predictions from this model as we discussed in
Section 4.1 may not accurately reflect any behavior that countries have towards the treaty
or with each other. We realize that the time period 1989-1992 was filled with other inter-
national developments that could have had a large impact on the outcome of the Basel
Convention (for instance, the fall of the Berlin Wall [2, 18], the dissolution of the Soviet
Union [8], and the birth of many new sovereign states). It is difficult to conclude that
these events affected the outcome of the treaty itself or, in general, any events affecting
the outcome of any particular treaty. If there had been more meetings to vote among the
countries (more data points), then the model itself can provide a brief narrative into the
behavior of the countries such as moving back and forth between supporting and non-
supporting. From the carbon pricing study, although initially seemed to be less suited for
our model, it nevertheless managed to capture accurate dynamics. Its success highlights
the model’s ability to account for domestically-driven policies where there are no cases of
countries being withdrawn from negotiation.
For future studies of this model, we can study treaties that have more than two meet-
ings to accurately predict their movements. Studies with large data size, such as the data
obtained from the World Bank’s “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018”, could ac-
count for the influence of external factors, such as domestic politics. However, we will note
that we only concentrate on a relatively small sub-task of negotiation dynamics which is
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quantifying movements of countries and predicting future movements. The grandiose task
of identifying the causality of change in country coalitions using mathematics is beyond
this research and can be the subject in future explorations. For other studies of this model,
additional parameters could be introduced in order to account for varying interest groups’
influences on a particular piece of policy. Modifying the model would make it possible to
study smaller political ecosystems like the dynamics of a bilateral relationship, such as
in the influence of American lobbying corporations and Korean Chaebols in the United
States-South Korea relationship [27]. Other practical applications of our model include
the study of peer pressure among teenagers (the spread of slang, drugs and games), the
proliferation of meme culture, and the development of cancer cells [9, 19, 25].
Ultimately, the simplicity of the model is both a strength and a weakness; it allows
for straightforward understandings of international treaty negotiations, but requires al-
teration in order to model more nuanced subjects.
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